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I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of the World Summit for Social Development, the
participating States issued the "Copenhagen Declaration on Social
Development and Programme of Action."' In this Declaration, they stated
that sustainable and equitable development must incorporate democracy;
social justice; economic development; environmental protection;
transparent and accountable governance; and universal respect for, and
observance of, all human rights. 2 Thus, the participating States reaffirmed
the view that development is a multifaceted process in which, inter alia,
economic development and human rights are so intertwined that
sustainable development cannot occur without both economic growth and the
3
promotion of human rights.
The participating States also called on other members of the
international community, including specialized agencies of the United
Nations, to support developing countries in their efforts to achieve
sustainable development. 4 The call to promote sustainable development
could not have been a surprise to the World Bank Group (World Bank) 5 and
1. Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development in Report of the U.N. World Summit for

Social Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.166/9 (1995) [hereinafter Copenhagen Declaration];
Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social Development, in Report of the U.N.
World Summit for Social Development, supra [hereinafter Programme of Action].
2. Copenhagen Declaration, supra note 1, para. 26. This perception is consistent with the
Declaration on the Right to Development, which also conceives of development as a
comprehensive process involving economic, social, cultural, political, and environmental
dimensions. G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41153
(1986). World Bank officials share this view. See, e.g., Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Democracy and
Development (Oct. 3,1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Shihata,
Democracy and Development]; Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Human Rights, Development and
InternationalFinancial Institutions, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 27 (1992); Ibrahim F.I.
Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal Issues and the Record
of Achievements, 17 DENV. J. INT'L. L. & POLY 39 (1988); James D. Wolfensohn, Speech at the
Annual Meeting of the World Bank (Oct. 1, 1995) (transcript available at
<http://www.worldbank.org>).
3. It should be noted that all aspects of sustainable and equitable development are intertwined.
However, in this Article the author has chosen to highlight the intertwining of human rights
and economic development in the work of the World Bank Group and the IMF. See Daniel D.
Bradlow & Claudio Grossman, Limited Mandates and Intertwined Problems: A New
Challenge for the World Bank and the IMF, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 411, 413-16 (1995) [hereinafter
Limited Mandates]; Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled
Towards a People-Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1
(1993) [hereinafter A People-CenteredLegal Order].
4. Copenhagen Declaration, supra note 1, Commitment 2, paras. (g), (h).
5. The World Bank Group consists of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International
Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). For a more detailed
description of the institutions in the World Bank Group, see 2 IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE
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the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 6 Over the fifty years of their
existence,
both institutions
have
dramatically
expanded
their
understanding of the concept of development. Both institutions, in fact, now
address social and human rights issues in their discussions with their
Member States and, in the case of the World Bank, in their operations in
these States.
For example, World Bank-funded operations 7 now promote such
economic, social, and cultural rights as health, education, social welfare,
jobs, and property. In addition, the World Bank, through its financing and
advisory activities, influences the status of women, children, indigenous
peoples, 8 and other vulnerable groups 9 in those Member States that borrow
from it. 10 The World Bank's governance operations, which address such
issues as the rule of law in society, reform of the civil service, and the
management of the public sector, have an impact on civil and political
rights in Borrower States. Furthermore, the World Bank's new practice of
requiring participation by primary stakeholders in the design and

WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD, SELECTED ESSAYS (1995); DANIEL D. BRADLOW,
UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH, THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, THE W ORLD BANK GROUP, AND DEBT MANAGEMENT (1993). In this
Article, the author shall focus on the IBRD and IDA, which collectively shall be referred to as
"the World Bank."
6. The IMF, the IBRD, and the IDA are specialized agencies of the United Nations. See
Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, art. IV(2), 16
U.N.T.S. 328, 332 (1948) [hereinafter U.N.-IMF Relationship Agreement]; Agreement
Between the United Nations and tie International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
art. IV(2), 16 U.N.T.S. 346, 348 (1948) [hereinafter U.N.-IBRD Relationship Agreement];
Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Development Association, G.A.
Res. 1594, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 1A, at 17, republished U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess.,
Annex 2, Agenda item 91 (1960) [hereinafter U.N.-IDA Relationship Agreement].
7. See infra Part II.C-D. for a more detailed discussion of the types of activities funded by the
World Bank.
8. WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, Operational Directive 4.20:
Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 1991) (discussing World Bank policy on indigenous people)
[hereinafter OPERATIONAL MANUAL].
9. OPERATIONAL MANUAL, supra note 8, Operational Directive 4.30: Involuntary
Resettlement (June 1990) (stating that World Bank policy on involuntary resettlement is
designed to ensure that those forced to relocate as a result of a Bank-funded project should still
share the benefits of the project). But see WORLD BANK, RESETTLEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT: THE BANKWIDE REVIEW OF PROJECTS INVOLVING INVOLUNTARY
RESETTLEMENT 1986-1993 (1994) (revealing Bank problems in implementing this policy).
10. Not all Member States are eligible to borrow from the World Bank. Those States that have a
per capita income of less than US$5,295 (in 1995 dollars) can borrow from the IBRD and less
than US$1,465 (in 1995 dollars) can borrow from IDA. In practice, however, only countries with
annual per capita incomes of less than US$905 receive IDA credits. In this Article, Member
States that are eligible for IBRD or IDA loans shall be referred to as "Borrower States" or
"Member States." The focus of this section of the Article is on the operation of the IBRD and IDA
in these States.
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The scope of the IMF's Article IV consultations 12 suggests that the IMF is
also capable of influencing the human rights situation in its Member
States. 13 This can be deduced from the fact "that during Article IV
consultations, the IMF has been known to engage the Member State in
discussions of its policies relating to health care, environment, welfare,
housing, unemployment, labor markets, military expenditures, and
14
certain aspects of the management of the State's public sector.
The degree of the IMF's influence varies depending on the Member
State's need for financial support. Since the advice given by the IMF in the
Article IV consultations may be converted into the conditionalities attached
to IMF financing, the IMF is able to exert greater influence over those
15
Member States who need or expect to need its financial assistance.
Given that human rights and the economic functions of the World Bank
and the IMF (collectively the International Financial Institutions, or the
IFIs) are inherently intertwined, the increasing involvement of the IFIs in
11. See WORLD BANK, THE W ORLD BANK PARTICIPATION SOURCEBOOK (1996) [hereinafter
PARTICIPATION SOURCEBOOK].
12. Pursuant to Article IV of its Articles of Agreement, the IMF is required to engage in
regular consultations with its Member States about their exchange rate policies. Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, art. IV, sec. 3, 6D Stat. 1401,
T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 51, amended, July 28, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 2775, amended, Apr. 1,
1978,29 U.S.T. 2203 [hereinafter IMF Articles]. For a description of Article IV consultations,
see, e.g., RICHARD W. EDWARDS, JR., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION 22,55868,571-80 (1985).
13. While it is mandatory for IMF Member States to hold regular consultations with the IMF,
they are not required to follow the advice the IMF offers them in the course of these
consultations. However, the IMF's report on the State will be discussed by the IMFs Board of
Directors and form part of the data used by the IMF in compiling its semi-annual report,
"World Economic Outlook." Consequently, the IMF's opinions may influence how other States
and financial actors perceive the Member State. See Executive Board Decision No. 6026-79/13
(Jan. 22, 1979), as amended by 10273-93/15 and 10364-93/67, in SELECTED DECISIONS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS OF THE IMF 13 (19th ed. 1994) (dealing with Article IV
consultations). For general description of the IMF and its operations, see ANAND G.
CHANDAVANKAR, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: ITS FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION
AND ACTIVITIES (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 42, 1984); A. W. HOOKE, THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND: ITS EVOLUTION, ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES (IMF Pamphlet Series
No. 3, 3rd ed. 1983); TREASURER'S DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND, FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE IMF (IMF Pamphlet Series No.
45, 2d ed. 1991) (discussing functions of IMF) [hereinafter TREASURER'S DEPARTMENT];
BRADLOW, supra note 5; see also IMBFSURVEY, SUPPLEMENT ON THE IMF (Sept. 1996).
14. See infra Part IH.C. for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
15. IMF influence is likely to be greatest in Member States that are eligible for Extended
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) support. For these countries, IMF policies may be
included in the Policy Framework Paper which will ultimately influence both IMF and World
Bank support for the State. See OPERATIONAL MANUAL, supra note 8 (discussing Policy
Framework Papers); TREASURER'S DEPARTMENT, supra note 13, at 80-83 (discussing ESAF).
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the social and human rights affairs of their Member States is not
surprising. 16 However, this involvement raises two important human
rights issues.
The first issue, which can be called the operational human rights issue,
pertains to the human rights impact of the IFIs' operations in their Member
States. It focuses on the IFIs' responsibilities for ensuring that the design
and implementation of their projects, programs, policies, and in-country
activities are consistent with internationally recognized human rights
standards.
There are two dimensions to this operational issue. The first is the
promotion of human rights, which concerns the obligations of the IFIs to
actively seek to improve the human rights situation in their Member
States. 17 The second dimension is the protection of human rights, which
concerns the obligations of the IFIs to help stop human rights abuses
1
perpetrated by their Member States. 8
The second issue, which can be called the institutional issue, pertains to
the internal rules and procedures of the IFIs. It focuses on the
responsibilities of the IFIs to ensure that their own internal operating rules
and procedures are consistent with internationally recognized human
rights standards. This issue highlights the transparency, accountability,
and accessibility of the IFIs' internal operating rules and procedures.' 9
Despite the importance of these two human rights issues to the overall
efficacy of their operations, the IFIs do not have well-developed, publicly
available human rights policies. Those policies that they do have tend to be
21
ad hoc 20 and ambiguous.
The lack of a coherent human rights policy has created problems both
22
for the IFI staff and for the other stakeholders in the IFIs' operations. It
deprives their staff of clear guidance on the scope of their human rights
responsibilities. In addition, it tends, by default, to delegate to the IFI staff
the authority to make their own policy decisions when these issues arise in
the course of their duties. The resulting decisions often appear to
stakeholders in the IFIs' operations to be arbitrary and difficult to
16. See generally, Limited Mandates, supra note 3.
17. See infra Parts II.D-E., III.C-D. for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
18. See infra Parts H.F., III.D. for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
19. See infra Part IV. for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
20. See infra Parts II.C., III.C. for a more detailed discussion of the evolution of the Bank and
IMF's involvement in the human rights policies of their Member States.
21. See infra Part II.E.1. for discussion of the "direct and obvious" test and its ambiguities.

22. The stakeholders in IFI operations include those portions of the Member State's population
that are directly affected by the IFIs' financing operations (this will be the entire population in
the case of IMF and World Bank structural adjustment loans), the Member State itself, the IFI,
the suppliers that stand to benefit from the financing operation, and other indirectly affected
persons in the States that are members of the IFIs.
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understand. This adversely affects the transparency and accountability of
the IFIs' operations, and makes it hard for outsiders to predict how the IFIs
23
will deal with future human rights situations.
In this paper I will argue that the IFIs must develop an explicit human
rights policy in order to resolve the human rights problems they face. This
policy should instruct staff and policymakers on how to appropriately
incorporate human rights considerations into all IFI operations. A
transparent and predictable human rights policy, provided it were well
publicized, would also enable all interested parties to understand what they
can expect from the IFIs when their activities have an effect on human
rights, and thus, to hold the IFIs accountable for their performance in this
regard.
In order to make this case, I shall first describe the evolution of the
World Bank's and the IMF's operations over the past fifty years. In these
sections I shall also discuss the human rights dimensions of the IFIs' work
and the nature of the legal constraints on their ability to consider human
rights issues in their operations. 24 Thereafter, I shall discuss the
institutional implications for the IFIs of this evolution in their operations.
Finally, I shall make some proposals regarding possible human rights
policies for the IFIs.
II. THE WORLD BANK

A. Introduction

This section of the Article begins with an analysis of the political
prohibition in the World Bank's Articles of Agreement. It is followed by a
description of the evolution of the Bank's operations and an explanation of
how this has influenced the interpretation of the political prohibition. The
final part of this section discusses the human rights impact of the Bank's

23. See infra Part IV. for further discussion of this issue.
24. The World Bank's Articles explicitly require the Bank to base its decisions only on
economic consultations and to not take political factors into account in its decisions. Articles
of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, 60
Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, amended, Dec. 17, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 1942
[hereinafter IBRD Articles]; Articles of Agreement of the International Development
Association, Jan. 26, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2284, T.I.A.S. No. 4607, 439 U.N.T.S. 249 [hereinafter
IDA Articles]. See infra Parts II.B., III.B. for a more detailed discussion of this issue. The
IMF's Articles do not explicitly prohibit it from considering political issues; however, the IMF
has interpreted the Articles as imposing such a prohibition. JOSEPH GOLD, THE RULE OF LAW
IN THE IMF, (IMF Pamphlet Series, No. 32, 1980); Francois P. Gianviti, Members' Rights and
Obligations Under the IMB's Articles of Agreement, in 3 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES
AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS 1,10 (Robert C. Effros ed., 1995). For further discussion of this
issue, see infra Part III.B.

Spring 19961

Tim W oRL BAiM THE IMF,AND HuMAN RIGHTS

and protective dimensions of
operations and focuses on both the promotional
25
the operational human rights issue.
For present purposes it is important to note that the International Bank
for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD) and International
Development Association (IDA) will only lend funds to nonmember
borrowers if a Member State either guarantees or approves the loan. 26 This
means that the Member State is always a participant in an IDA or IBRD
financing arrangement. As a result, in principle the IBRD and IDA are
always in a position to influence their Borrower States' human rights
27
situations.
B. The Bank's Mandate
The mandate of both the IBRD and IDA (hereinafter referred to
collectively as the "Bank") is to assist development efforts in their Member
States. The IBRD's Articles of Agreement state that the purposes of the IBRD
include "assist[ing] in the reconstruction and development of territories of
members," and "promot[ing] the long range balanced growth of
international trade and the maintenance of equilibrium in balance of
payments . . . thereby assisting in raising productivity, the standard of
living and conditions of labor in [members'] territories."28
The purposes of the IDA, according to its Articles of Agreement, are to
"promote economic development, increase productivity and thus raise
standards of living in the less-developed areas of the world . . . thereby
furthering the developmental objectives of the International Bank for
29
Reconstruction and Development."
Interestingly,
neither institution's
Articles
define
the term
"development." The Bank does not disagree with the international
community's conception of development as a comprehensive process
25. A full discussion of the institutional issue is deferred until later in this Article. See infra

Part IV.
26. The IBRD Articles state that if the Member State is not the borrower, "the member or the
central bank or some comparable agency" must fully guarantee the loan. EBRD Articles,
supra note 24, art. III(4)(i). The IDA's Articles of Agreement state that the IDA cannot provide
financing for any project"ifthe member inwhose territory the projectis located objects to such
financing." IDA Articles, supra note 24, art. V, sec. 1(e).

27. International human rights law deals with the State's relationship to its citizens. See e.g.,
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1990) (describing the

scope of international human rights law).
28. IBRD Articles, supra note 24, art. I. The other purposes of the IBRD are "to promote private
foreign capital by means of guarantees or participation in loans and other investments made
by private investors, ... to arrange the loans made or guaranteed by [the IBRD, and] . . . to
conduct its operations with due regard to the effect of international investment on business
conditions in the territories of members." Id., art. I, (ii),(iv),(v).
29. IDA Articles, supra note 24, art. I.
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incorporating
economic, social, cultural, political, and spiritual
dimensions. 30 Nevertheless, the IBRD and IDA contend that as specialized
economic organizations 3 l they have a limited mandate. This restricts their
32
permissible activities to the economic aspects of the development process.
The other aspects of the development process fall outside the scope of the
Bank's permissible range of activities.
In support of its position, the Bank points out that the Articles of
Agreement of both the IDA and the IBRD place limits on what factors they
can consider in their decisions. For example, the IBRD's Articles require it
to ensure that its funds are "used only for the purposes for which the loan
was granted with due attention to considerations of economy and efficiency
and without regard to political or other non-economic influences or
considerations."3 3 Lest there be any doubt about their economic focus, the
Articles of both the IBRD and IDA state that:

The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political
affairs of any member, nor shall they be influenced in their
decisions by the political character of the member or
members concerned. Only economic considerations shall
be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall
be weighed impartially in order to achieve th6 purposes
34
stated in Article I.

Despite the strong emphasis the Articles place on ensuring that IBRD
and IDA decisions are based only on "economic considerations," neither
institution's Articles define "economic considerations." Similarly, neither
35
institution's Articles define "political affairs" or "political character."
30. See supra note 2. The international community endorsed this conception of development at
tie World Summit for Social Development. See Copenhagen Declaration, supra note 1, para.
26.
31. The IBRD and IDA are specialized agencies of the United Nations. See supranote 6.
32. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Issues of Governance In Borrowing Members and the Extent of Their
Relevance Under the Bank's Articles of Agreement (Dec. 21, 1991) (unpublished
memorandum of the Vice President and General Counsel of tie World Bank) (on file with
author); see also SHIHATA, supra note 5, at 553-78 (discussing governance and human rights in
Bank Member States); Shihata, Democracy and Development, supra note 2.
33. IBRD Articles, supra note 24, art. I, sec. 5(b). The IDA operates under an identical
restraint. IDA Articles, supra note 24, art V, sec. 1(g).
34. IBRD Articles, supra note 24, art. IV, sec. 10; IDA Articles, supra note 24, art. V, sec. 6. The
Articles of Agreement of these two organizations also stipulate that the Member States shall
respect the international character of these organizations and refrain from seeking to
influence the officials of these organizations who owe their primary duty of loyalty to the
organization. IBRD Articles, supra, art. V, sec. 5(c); IDA Articles, supra, art. VI, sec. 5(c).

35. It appears from statements made at tin Bretton Woods Conference by Harry Dexter White,
Lord Keynes, and by ti U.S. Treasury that the purpose of the political prohibition was to
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This enables both institutions to interpret for themselves the term.
"economic considerations" in order to determine what issues and activities
fall within their permissible scope of operations. They are also free to
decide what issues to treat as "political" and thus outside their jurisdiction.
C. The Evolution in the Bank's Operations
Over the past fifty years, the Bank has steadily expanded its
understanding of what factors qualify as economic considerations within
the meaning of its Articles. In its early years, when the Bank's position was
that development referred to economic growth, it interpreted economic
considerations as including only those issues that were directly relevant to
the financial and technical feasibility of the projects it was funding and to
36
the project's impact on the economic growth potential of the Member State.
In this regard it should be noted that the Articles of the IBRD require it to
ascertain whether the borrower or the guarantor "will be in a position to
37
meet [their] obligations under the loan."
One of the benefits of the Bank's original interpretation of economic
considerations was that it respected the Borrowing State's sovereignty. It
appeared to leave to the Borrowing State all the difficult political judgments,
such as which potential projects should be given the highest priority, who
should benefit from the project, and how the costs associated with the project
should be shared among the citizens of the Borrowing State.
The Bank's initial perception of development did not prove to be
sustainable. Beginning in the 1960s, the Bank, faced with the failure of
ensure that the Bank acted impartially. See United Nations: Statements of U.N. Legal
Counsel and IBRD General Counsel on Relations of U.N. and IBRD and Effect of U.N.
Resolutions, 6 I.L.M. 150 (1967) (regarding World Bank loans to South Africa and Portugal)
[hereinafter Broches Statement].

In 1966, the Bank's Legal Counsel transmitted a memorandum to the United Nations in
which he attempted to explain why the IBRD's Articles prohibited it from complying with
General Assembly Resolutions requesting the Bank to refrain from extending credit to South
Africa and Portugal. The General Counsel argued that the prohibition had two purposes. The
first was to prevent the possibility of using Bank financing as leverage against any Bank
member to advance the political aims of any other member or group of members. The second
reason was to assist the Bank in raising capital from investors who may be concerned that the
Bank was basing its lending decisions on political considerations. See id.; see also Ibrahim
F.I. Shihata, Legal Opinion on Governance (unpublished memorandum, on file with author)
[hereinafter Shihata, Opinion on Governance]; BARTRAM S. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES
AND THE POLITICIZATION OF THE WORLD BANK: ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLICY (1992).
36. Broches Statement, supra note 35; see also Shihata, Opinion on Governance, supra note 35
(explaining that the aim of Bank was to base decisions on impartial and technical criteria).
37. IBRD Articles, supra note 24, art. I, sec. 4(v). The IDA Articles do not have this provision.
However, they do require the IDA, in its lending decisions, to have regard for the "economic
position" of the area in which it lends and for the "nature and requirements of the project." IDA
Articles, supra note 24, art. V, sec. 2(b).
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economic growth to adequately address the problems of the poor, began
broadening its understanding of which activities were included within the
scope of its mandate by focusing more directly on poverty alleviation and
basic human needs. 38 Thus, in addition to physical infrastructure projects,
the Bank began to fund development activities related to health, education,
agriculture, and housing. Later the Bank, again responding to its evolving
understanding of the developmental problems of its Member States, added
policy-based lending, environmental concerns, and gender issues to its list
of permissible operations. 39 More recently, faced with the continuing
developmental problems of many of its Member States, the Bank has added
governance, economic transformation, and private sector development to
its repertoire of appropriate operations. 40 It is now also attempting to
41
incorporate public participation into most of its operations.

D. The Human Rights Implications of the Bank's Operations
Each step in the expansion of the Bank's range of activities has forced it
to confront operational issues that require it to make policy judgments. For
example, it is not possible for the Bank to fund projects designed to alleviate
poverty without making some judgment about who the poor are and who the
relative winners and losers in these projects should be. 42 The Bank's
failure to adequately consider all aspects of these issues may result in
projects that either do not achieve their intended results or that perpetuate
discriminatory treatment of certain vulnerable population groups. 43

38. EDWARD S. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, THE W ORLD BANK SINCE BRETTON W OODS
(1973). For a critical perspective, see CHERYL PAYER, THE W ORLD BANK: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS (1982).
39. See, e.g., 1 PAUL MOSLEY IT AL., AID AND POWER: THE WORLD BANK ANDvPOLICY
BASED LENDING (1991); BRUCE RICH, MORTGAGING THE EARTH (1994).
40. SHIHATA, supra note 5.
41. PARTICIPATION SOURCEBOOK, supra note 11.
42. It should be noted that defining who should be the beneficiaries of a poverty alleviation
project is not a simple task. For example, a project aimed at helping subsistence farmers
might help those who own land but not those who work on other people's land. The latter group
maybe more numerous and poorer than the subsistence farmers. The same project may also
benefit poor men at the expense of poor women. See generally, LAUREN MC GLYNN, THE
W ORLD BANK AND THE REALIZATION OF THE RIGHTS OF W OMEN IN AGRICULTURE AND
RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 15 (1991) (discussing the
situation of women in development); JOSETTE MURPHY, GENDER ISSUES ON WORLD BANK
LENDING (1995); KATRINA A. SAITO & DAPHNE SPURLING, DEVELOPING AGRICULTURAL
EXTENSION FOR W OMEN FARMERS (World Bank Discussion Paper No. 156, 1992); W ORLD
BANK, ADVANCING GENDER EQUALITY: FROM CONCEPT TO ACTION (1995); W ORLD BANK,
POVERTY REDUCTION HANDBOOK (1993).
43. There are many examples of problems that can arise when the Bank fails to adequately
consider all aspects of these issues. See, e.g., BRADFORD MORSE & T. BERGER, SARDAR
SAROVAR: THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW (1992) [hereinafter SARDAR
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Similarly, the Bank cannot fund adjustment programs without also, at
least implicitly, making judgments about the capacity of governments, and
even of individual government officials, to implement and sustain the
44
adjustment program.
The complexity and the sensitivity of the issues that the Bank must
consider have grown exponentially with the evolution of the Bank's
adjustment-related work. As the focus in the adjustment programs has
shifted from macroeconomic policymaking to the formulation and
implementation of policy at a sector and even sub-sector level, the Bank has
become ever more deeply involved in the affairs of some of its Member
States.
For example, the Bank's initial concern with macroeconomic
policymaking led it to focus on, inter alia, problems in the Member State's
financial sector. Faced with these problems, the Bank began to fund
financial sector adjustment loans that were designed initially to produce
market-oriented policy changes in the Borrower State's financial sector.
However, the focus on these policy changes highlighted other problems in
the financial sector. In response, the Bank broadened its operations to
include reform of supervisory and regulatory arrangements in the
financial sector. This, in turn, helped raise the issue of the efficacy of the
implementation of government regulation in the financial sector. These
issues caused the Bank to further expand its scope of activities to include
promoting the transparency and enforceability of the legal and regulatory
structure in the Borrower State. This focus on legal reform highlighted the
problems faced by the judiciary in some Bank Member States and has now
45
led the Bank to fund several judicial reform projects.
This evolution in Bank adjustment lending, together with the Bank's
stated concern with poverty alleviation and the development of human
resources, has expanded the range of activities now funded by the Bank (in
addition to its traditional infrastructure projects) to include: reform of the
civil service; reform of the management of public sector enterprises; legal
and judicial reform; family planning; improving the quality of education
and the equity of access to primary education; reform of universities;
development of the private sector; land titling and registration reform; and
programs to ensure that vulnerable groups such as women, children,
indigenous people, and other minorities get access to health, education, and

SAROVAR]; RAYMOND F. MIKESELL & LARRY W ILLIAMS, INTERNATIONAL BANKS AND THE

ENVIRONMENT
(1986).

(1992); PAYER, supra note 38; SIERRA CLUB, BANKROLLING

DISASTERS

44. MOSLEY ET AL., supra note 39.

45. This progression in Bank lending can be discerned from the description of Bank loans
contained in tie Bank's annual reports. Similar evolutions in Bank operations have been
occurring in all sectors in which the Bank funds the operations in the Borrower State. For
further discussion of this issue see infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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other Bank-funded programs. In addition, during the past two 46years the
Bank has actively promoted public participation in its operations.
A comparison of the IBRD's and IDA's operations in 1990 and 1995
demonstrates the dramatic change in the Bank's operations. 47 In 1990, only
one of the 234 loans made by the two institutions explicitly incorporated
participation as an element of the project design. By 1995, participation was
an element in ninety-two of the 243 projects funded by the Bank. In 1990, the
two institutions made no loans for judicial reform. By 1995, they had made
five loans designed, at least in part, to promote such reform. In 1990 the
Bank funded no projects designed to strengthen property rights or to promote
land reform. By 1995, the Bank was funding such projects in countries as
diverse as Indonesia, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Thailand, and Russia. 48 In
1990, the Bank's governance operations were focused on improving the
efficiency of the management of the public sector and on liberalizing
policies in specific spheres of activity. By 1995, the scope of its governance
activities had expanded to include strengthening local governments and
devolving power from central to local governments; restoring or creating
basic governmental functions in the Occupied Territories, Burundi,
Rwanda, and Haiti; and restoring public confidence in the integrity and
competence of the public sectors in Guatemala. 4 9 Since 1990, the IBRD and
IDA have also funded projects to reform or develop university education; to
improve the equity of access to, and the quality of, education; to improve
educational opportunities for young girls; to promote health care for
women; to provide assistance to indigenous peoples and other minorities; to
assist countries in developing legal training programs; and to assist
Uganda in laying a foundation for decreasing historic regional
inequalities within the country.5 0
This brief description of the Bank's operations illustrates the wide
range of human rights issues that can arise from the Bank's activities. For
example, the Bank influences the rights of individuals to be free from
discrimination and their rights to education and health when it finances
projects that promote equity in access to health or education. Similarly, the
Bank influences the ability of people to exercise their rights in their
interactions with their governments when it finances reforms of the civil
service. Also, the Bank raises questions about freedom of expression and
association when it finances projects incorporating public participation
into their design and implementation. In addition, by financing changes
46. This information is drawn from various project summaries contained in the World
Bank's annual reports. See W ORLD BANK, WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT 1990, at 137-81;

1991, at 161-78; 1992, at 157-95; 1993, at 145-88; 1994, at 122-43; 1995, at 104-23 [hereinafter
ANNUAL REPORTS].
47. See ANNUAL REPORTS, supranote 46,1990 and 1995 project summaries.

48. Id.
49. See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 46,1994 and 1995 project summaries.

50. Id.
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in the management of universities and in the quality of education, the bank
influences academic freedom. Finally, when the Bank finances a program
of judicial reform, even if the program is only intended to improve specific
aspects of the judiciary's operations, 5 ' it affects the way in which that
judicial system will work for all those who seek its assistance. On a
broader level, it also influences every person's access to the judicial
system.
In short, it seems reasonable to conclude on the basis of the Bank's
present range of activities that its operations have a direct effect on the
following human rights in its Borrower States: the right to due process; the
right to free association and expression; the right to participate in the
government and the cultural life of the community; the right to work; the
right to health care, education, food, and housing; and the rights of women,
children, and indigenous peoples to nondiscriminatory treatment.5 2 In
addition, depending on the Borrower State's response to its citizens who take
advantage of opportunities created by Bank-funded projects, the Bank can
have an impact on human rights associated with the integrity of the
person.5 3 This will occur if the State or its agents take reprisals against
citizens who use the opportunity created by the Bank's invitation to
54
participate in its operations to oppose the projects sponsored by the State.
E. The Human Rights Issues Raised by the Bank's Operations
While there are a number of well-known cases where Bank-funded
projects have resulted in human rights abuses, 55 the standard Bank
51. The Bank has attempted to limit its governance and legal reform efforts to those issues that

have a "direct and obvious" economic effect. Consequently its judicial reform projects have
tended to focus on judicial administration and the judiciary's ability to deal with economic
and commercial issues. See Shihata, Opinion on Governance, supra note 35; LAWYERS
COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE W ORLD BANK: GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(1993) [hereinafter GOVERNANCE]; LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UPDATE ON
GOVERNANCE (1995) [hereinafter UPDATE ON GOVERNANCE]. For a critical analysis of
judicial reform, see LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HALFWAY TO REFORM,
THE W ORLD BANK AND THE VENEZUELAN JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996).
52. These rights are drawn from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976);
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res.
34/180 U.N. Doc. A134146 (Dec. 18, 1979), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980); Convention on the
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44125 (Nov. 20, 1989), U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at
167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989); and the U.N. CHARTER.
53. These rights include the right against torture, the right to a fair trial, and the right not to be
detained without trial.
54. For a discussion of the Bank's responsibilities in these situations, see infra Part V.B.3.
55. See e.g., SARDAR SAROVAR, supra note 43; LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY RESEARCH AND ADVOCACY, IN THE NAME OF
DEVELOPMENT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WORLD BANK IN INDONESIA (1995); JUSTICE
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operation gives rise to less dramatic-but no less important-human rights
concerns. The following sections discuss these latter concerns in more
detail.
1. The PoliticalProhibitionin the Bank's Articles
The first human rights issue raised by the Bank's standard operations
56
pertains to how the Bank interprets the political prohibition in its Articles.
To date, the distinction the Bank draws between "economic" and "political"
factors has been based on the impact the particular factor has on
considerations of efficiency and economy. 57 On this basis, the Bank has
defined an economic factor, within the meaning of the Bank's Articles of
Agreement, as any factor that has a "'direct and obvious' economic effect
relevant to the [Bank's] work."5 8 The Bank uses a three-part test to
determine if the economic effect of a particular factor in a Bank operation is
"direct and obvious." The economic effect must be (1) clear and
unequivocal; (2) preponderant; and (3) when the issue is associated with
political actions or flows from political events, the economic effect "must be
59
of such impact and relevance as to make [it] a Bank concern."
The Bank's General Counsel has also attempted to define the term
political. He has suggested that the term political relates to "the art and
practice of running a country or governing."60 It includes those factors that
would require the Bank to take a side in the political system of its Borrower
States, such as favoring one political party or faction over another. It also
includes considerations that might result in Bank decisions being
influenced by the principles, opinions, or beliefs of the people or parties
holding power in its Member States. 61 The General Counsel would exclude
from the term "such typical economic and technical issues as the

DENIED!: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1994);
Request for Inspection-Nepal: Arun III Hydroelectric Project, Nov. 3, 1994, IPN Request RQ
94/1 (available at <http://www.worldbank.org/ins-panel.html>);
Request for InspectionRodonia Natural Resources management Project, IPN Request RQ 953 (available at
<http://www.worldbank.org/ins-panel.html>).
56. IBRD Articles, supra note 24.
57. Shihata, Opinion on Governance, supranote 35.
58. Id.; SHIHATA, supra note 5,at 53-97.
59. See Shihata, Opinion on Governance, supra note 35. It should be noted that the Bank has
always recognized that political developments inside a country can be so important that they
affect that country's future stability. In such situations, the Bank is required to consider these
political developments because they will influence the project's success and the borrower's
ability to perform its obligations under the loan agreement. See Broches Statement, supra note
35.
60. See Shihata, Opinion on Governance, supranote 35.
61. Id.
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'management of money or the finances' or more generally the efficient
62
management of the country's resources."
The governance issues that the Bank considers inside its mandate
demonstrate how the Bank applies these definitions. The Bank considers
issues that relate to the degree and quality of the Borrower State's
intervention in its economy as falling within the Bank's economic
mandate because they have a direct effect on investment prospects in the
country. Based on this rationale the Bank supports the Borrower State's
efforts to reform its civil service, improve those aspects of its legal system
that directly affect the conduct of commerce, increase the degree of
accountability for public funds, and foster discipline in the budgeting
63
process.
The ambiguity in the Bank's interpretation of its mandate can be seen
in its decision that female genital mutilation is an economic issue. The
Bank has justified this decision by pointing to the economic costs associated
with female genital mutilation. 64 In contrast, the Bank has not been
willing to treat freedom of the press as an economic issue, despite the
65
obvious economic costs associated with the lack of a free press.
These examples suggest that the Bank's interpretation of its direct and
obvious test is not based on easily identifiable criteria. The apparent
arbitrariness of the direct and obvious test is not surprising. The test is easy
to state but very difficult to apply. A key problem is that the test does not
stipulate the time period over which the directness and the obviousness of the
economic impact of the particular factor should be determined. If the time
period for analysis is short, then relatively few nonobvious economic issues
will have a direct and obvious effect.
Many Bank projects and programs, however, are implemented over a
relatively long period of time and are designed to produce benefits over an
even longer period. Consequently, it does not seem unreasonable to
measure the direct and obvious effects of certain aspects of these operations
over a period of time that roughly coincides with the project time frame.
However, given that political and economic factors are inherently

62. Id.
63. Id. See also WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK EXPERIENCE (1994);
W ORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (1992).
64. See George Graham, Pledge over Female Mutilation: World Bank and IMF Win
Commitment by Burkina Faso,FIN. TIMES, Apr. 22,1994, at A6.
65. JEAN DREZE & ARMTATYA SEN, HUNGER AND PUBLIC ACTION 263-64 (1989). Professor

Sen has stated that [there has never been a famine in any country thafs been a democracy
with a relatively free press.. . . I know of no exception. It applies to very poor countries with
democratic systems as well as to rich ones." Sylvia Nasar, Is Never Fair to Just Blame the
Weather, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1993, at Al. Another benefit of a free press is information
disclosure. This enables investors to identify business opportunities and risks, and allows
citizens to hold their government more accountable.
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intertwined, 66 it is likely that within such a time frame almost all political,
social, and cultural issues will have a direct and obvious economic effect on
the Bank-funded project or program and on the Borrower State's ability to
perform its loan obligations. Consequently, on the basis of the direct and
obvious test, the Bank should treat almost all issues as economic issues.
To cite an example, consider a Bank Member State that decides on
human rights grounds to grant all criminal defendants the right to counsel
and a fair trial. Prima facie, this decision would appear to be a political
decision that is not relevant to Bank decisionmaking. However, this
decision, over time, can have significant and potentially contradictory
economic effects. On the one hand, the resulting improvement in the
Member State's human rights situation could lead to an improvement in
business confidence, which could result in increased investment,
increased employment, and reduced social tensions. On the other hand, the
decision could lead to a reallocation of resources towards the criminal
justice system, which could result in a reduction of resources available to
the civil justice system. The need for police officers to spend more time in
court testifying in criminal trials could lead to a reduction in the number of
police officers available to prevent crime. In addition, the decision could
lead to a budgeting reallocation to the criminal justice system with adverse
consequences for other areas of the budget. These developments could
adversely affect business confidence leading to a reduction in investment,
a rise in unemployment and social tensions, and a decline in the Borrower
State's ability to perform its loan obligations. 6 7 In either case, it is clear that
the decision will have direct economic consequences.
The potential effects of this ostensible human rights decision therefore
indicate that the Bank should treat the decision to grant criminal
defendants the right to counsel as an economic issue. This creates a
problem, however, in that it suggests that all issues are economic and that,
as a result, there is no issue that is excluded from the scope of the Bank's
jurisdiction. The Bank's adoption of such an approach would undermine its
role as a specialized international organization and would substantially
alter the balance in the Bank-Member State relationship. Nevertheless, it
must be recognized that failure of the direct and obvious test to incorporate a
all-encompassing
temporal dimension either leads to the adoption of this
68
approach or results in decisions that appear arbitrary.

66. Limited Mandates,supra note 3, at 413-16.
67. REGINALD H.

GREEN, PARTICIPATORY

PLURALISM

AND PERVASIVE POVERTY: SOME

REFLECTIONS 21 (1989) (discussing the consequences of criminal justice reforms that are

inspired by external pressure).
68. This issue will be addressed again in Part V. of this Article, in which the author discusses
the contents of a possible IFI human rights policy.
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2. The Bank and the InternationalHuman Rights Conventions
The second human rights issue raised by the Bank's operations focuses
on the international human rights conventions. The fact that the Bank is
not a signatory to any of the major human rights conventions means that
the Bank is not required to specifically apply internationally recognized
human rights standards in its operations. Similarly, it is not required to
follow the decisions or recommendations of any of the specialized human
rights agencies. 69 In theory, therefore, the Bank can develop its own human
rights standards.
There are, however, limits on the Bank's ability to develop human
rights guidelines that do not conform to internationally accepted human
rights standards. First, the Bank is a specialized agency of the United
Nations and consequently is required to act in conformity with the U.N.
Charter. 70 Second, the Bank, as an international organization, is a subject
of international law and therefore can not violate customary international
law. 71 Thus, for example, it can neither directly nor indirectly fund States
that practice genocide or racially discriminatory conduct. Also, the Bank's
operations should not undermine the ability of its Member States to live up to
their international legal obligations. This suggests that, at least in those
countries that are signatories to human rights conventions, the Bank may
have an obligation to ensure that its operations do not undermine the
country's efforts to abide by these conventions. 72 This would include
ensuring that the projects it funds do not distribute their costs and benefits
in such a way as to undermine the Borrower State's efforts to meet its
international legal obligations.
3. The Bank-Borrower State Relationship
The third human rights issue raised by the Bank's operations is the
amount of influence it has over the development policies, including the
human rights policies, of its Member States. The Bank is able to exert
influence through its lending operations, policy dialogue, technical
assistance, and research programs. The degree of influence will depend on
the relative bargaining position of the Bank and the Member State. This
69. There is no agreement requiring the Bank to abide by the recommendations of the United
Nations or its specialized agencies. See U.N.-IBRD Relationship Agreement, supra note 6;

U.N.-IDA Relationship Agreement, supra note 6.
70. DEREK W. BOWETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (4th ed. 1982); HENRY
G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1995).

71. BOWETT, supra note 70; SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 70.
72. Applying this standard will not be easy given the differing interpretations States may have
about how to implement their human rights obligations. Limited Mandates, supra note 3. A
satisfactory outcome to this problem would be facilitated by an explicit Bank human rights
policy. For more detailed discussion of this issue, see infra Part V.A.
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will be affected by such factors as the strength of the Bank's views on the
Borrower State's needs, the relationship between the relevant Bank officials
and the Borrower State, the quality of the State's own development planning,
the clarity of the State's own perspective on the services it needs from the
Bank, and the State's access to alternative sources of funds.
The Bank is able to use the lack of transparency in its interpretation of
the political prohibition in its Articles to enhance its bargaining power. The
lack of clear guidelines about what human rights and other political issues
fall within its jurisdiction allow Bank officials great discretion in
deciding which issues can and which can not be considered in the design
and implementation of Bank-funded operations. This may work to the
detriment of the Borrower State, which may be seeking to develop policies
that are consistent with its international human rights obligations but
which may not conform to the relevant Bank official's view of the
appropriate policies for the State. It may also harm other stakeholders in the
Bank-borrower relationship who may be seeking external assistance in
encouraging a State to live up to its international legal obligations.
On the other hand, the lack of clear guidelines can present an
opportunity for well-prepared Borrower States. These States, as well as
nongovernmental stakeholders in Bank operations, can use their superior
knowledge of local conditions and local needs, and their own development
planning process to enhance their bargaining position with the Bank. In
addition, if they can convince Bank officials to treat their human rights
concerns as "economic" issues, they can also harness the services of the
Bank to promote their own human rights agenda.
F. Protection of Human Rights
The discussion so far has focused on the Bank's obligations to promote
human rights. The Bank, however, also has some obligation to protect
victims of human rights abuses from the perpetrators of those abuses. The
Bank's obligations in this regard arise primarily when a potential
Borrower State is guilty of serious human rights abuses. These abuses could
be either directly related to or completely unconnected with the specific
Bank operation. An example of abuses related to Bank activities would be
where citizens suffer reprisals after accepting the Bank's offer to participate
in the Bank-funded operation. An example of unconnected abuses would be
where the Borrower State is guilty of widespread arbitrary arrests and
detentions without trial, and in which the detainees are held for activities
unconnected to the potential Bank-funded operation.
For a number of reasons, the protection of human rights is a much more
difficult issue for the Bank than the promotion of human rights. The first
reason is that no country in the world has a perfect human rights record.
Consequently, if the Bank were to set too high a human rights standard it
would not be able to lend to any country. On the other hand, if the Bank does
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not set any such standards, it runs the risk of supporting governments that
and thus, which are
are engaging in gross human rights violations,
73
incapable of promoting sustainable development.
Second, the Bank's efforts to identify human rights situations that
require it to take protective action are complicated by the fact that human
rights law treats all human rights as being of equal value. Consequently,
different States may choose to emphasize different human rights at
different stages in their development process. It is not easy for the Bank or
any other observer to balance respect for these choices with an assessment of
has reached such a serious state that
when the State's human rights situation
74
it requires a specific Bank response.
Third, the Bank's ability to protect human rights is limited by the fact
that it is a specialized economic organization. Thus, the Bank is unlikely to
have the in-house expertise needed to identify those human rights situations
that are sufficiently serious to merit a Bank response or to determine what
the appropriate response should be. There is, however, a solution to this
problem. The Bank should work with specialized human rights
organizations and other expert groups to formulate a policy for identifying
countries where the human rights situation requires a response by the
75
Bank.
A fourth reason is that even after the Bank determines that the human
rights situation is sufficiently serious to warrant protective action, it is not
clear what the Bank's response should be. It is possible that any one of the
following three mutually contradictory responses could be the most
productive: (1) the Bank should cease making any loan commitments or
disbursements to the State, (2) the Bank should continue lending on the
assumption that the development projects it is funding will ultimately help
produce a change in the State's human rights situation, or (3) the Bank
should continue lending but only to projects which help empower the victims
to defend their human rights.
Historically the Bank has responded by treating the issue of
unconnected human rights violations as a political issue that is outside its
jurisdiction. However, the Bank's efforts to promote good governance in
Borrowing States undermines this position. There are two reasons for this.
First, governance operations force the Bank to address issues relating to
how the State manages its resources, including its human resources. 76 The
management of human resources necessarily implicates human rights
considerations. Second, it is difficult for the Bank to argue that
73. Sustainable Development is a comprehensive process involving economic, social, cultural,
political, and environmental aspects. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
74. Limited Mandates, supra note 3.

75. Some proposals for this policy will be discussed in Part V. of this Article.
76. See WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 63; WORLD BANK,
GOVERNANCE, supra note 63.
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governments guilty of widespread human rights violations are practicing
sustainable good governance.
The question of how to deal with the protection of human rights victims
has also acquired greater relevance now that the Bank is promoting
participation as part of its standard operating procedure. In this regard the
Bank needs to develop guidelines for determining when people have had an
adequate opportunity to participate in Bank-funded projects. It also needs to
formulate a policy for dealing with situations of inadequate participation
and situations in which some person or group, invited to participate in a
Bank-funded project, suffers reprisals as a result of their participation in
77
the project design and implementation process.
G. The Institutional Human Rights Issue
The final issue that human rights raise for the Bank relates to its own
internal operating procedures. The Bank, as a subject of international law,
should ensure that its operations are conducted in a way that is consistent
with the internationally recognized rights of the citizens of its Member
States. This suggests that the Bank's operating rules and procedures should
incorporate such elements of due process as transparent procedures, open
7
communications, and accountability. 8
III. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

A. Introduction
In this section I argue that over the past 50 years the IMF has been
transformed from a monetary institution with a clearly defined scope of
operations into an institution whose activities often appear to focus more on
developmental than monetary matters. 79 While the causes of this
77. See Limited Mandates, supra note 3; Shihata, Democracy and Development, supra note 2, at

7.
78. It should be pointed out that these rights coincide with the elements of good governance that

the Bank suggests its Borrower States incorporate into their own operating practices.
Consequently, it is hard to see what objection there can be to the Bank practicing what it itself
preaches. Daniel D. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Complainants: The

Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 64 VA. J. INT'L L. 553 (1994). The institutional
challenges that this creates for the Bank will be discussed in a later part of this Article. See
infra Part IV.
79. For reviews of the IFI's first 50 years of operation, see, e.g., Robert S. Browne, Rethinking
the IMFon its Fiftieth Anniversary, in THE WORLD BANKIS MONETARY SYSTEM (Jo Marie

Griesgraber & Bernhard G. Gunther eds., 1996); Barry Eichengreen & Peter B. Kenen,
Managing the World Economy Under the Bretton Woods System, in MANAGING THE W ORLD
ECONOMY 3 (Peter B. Kenen ed., 1994); BRETTON WOODS COMMISSION, BRETTON WOODS:
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE (1994); FITY YEARS AFTER BRETTON W OODS: THE FUTURE OF
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expansion in the IMF's operations differs from those of the Bank, the result
has been similar. Today, the IMF, like the Bank, exerts some influence
over the human rights situation in its Member States. 80 Moreover, the IMF
is exerting this influence with an even less developed human rights policy
than the Bank.
In order to make this case, I shall begin with a discussion of the IMF's
Articles of Agreement and the evolution in its operations. This discussion
will be followed by an analysis of the IMF's present involvement in the
human rights situation in its Member States.
B. The IMF's Mandate
81
The IMF, like the Bank, is a specialized agency of the United Nations.
It was established to help regulate the international monetary system and to
provide financial support to Member States that were experiencing balance
of payments problems. According to its Articles of Agreement, the purposes
of the IMF, inter alia, are to promote monetary cooperation, to promote
orderly and stable exchange rates, to assist in the establishment of a
multilateral system of payments for current transactions, and to give
confidence to Member States by helping them correct balance of payments
problems in a manner that is not destructive of either international or
82
domestic prosperity.

Until the collapse of the par value system,8 3 the IMF's job was relatively
simple. It monitored its Member States' international monetary policies to
ensure that they were consistent with the maintenance of their currencies'

THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK (James M. Boughton & l Sarwar Lateef eds., 1995)
[hereinafter FIFTY YEARS AFTER].
80. Margaret Conklin & Daphne Davidson, The I.M.F. and Economic and Social Human
Rights: A Case Study of Argentina, 1958-1985,8 HUM. RTS. Q. 2Z7 (1986); Michael Lucas, The
InternationalMonetary Fund's Conditionality and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and CulturalRights: An Attempt to Define the Relation, 25 R. BEL. D. INT'L 104 (1992);
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Crossing the Rubicon: Synthesizing the Soft InternationalLaw of
the IMFand Human Rights, 11 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 81 (1993).
81. U.N.-IMF Relationship Agreement, supra note 6.
82. IMF Articles, supra note 12, art. I.
83. According to the original Articles of the IMF, each Member State was required to establish a
fixed value for its currency. Each State had to ensure that its currency did not fluctuate in
value by more than 1% above or below this par value. (This was later changed to 2.5%.) IMF
Member States, therefore, had a legal obligation to take corrective action any time the value of
their currency began to deviate from the par value by more than the prescribed amount. Only
in cases of "fundamental disequilibrium" could States change the par value of their currency
by either devaluing or revaluing it. IMF Articles, supra note 12, art. IV (Articles prior t
amendments); EDWARDS, supra note 12; JOSEPH GOLD, LEGAL EFFECTS OF FLUCTUATING
EXCHANGE RATES 3 (1990).
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par value. The IMF was also expected to provide its members with short84
term financing when they experienced balance of payments difficulties.
The IMF's primary mechanism for monitoring its Member States'
exchange rates and balance of payments policies was (and still is) the
regular consultations it conducted with these States pursuant to Article IV of
its Articles of Agreement. The par value system tended to place some limits
on the scope of these Article IV consultations. Since the purpose of these
periodic consultations was to determine the State's ability to maintain its
par value, the consultations could be limited to those macroeconomic
variables that directly affected the external value of the State's currency
during the period under consideration (usually one year). Thus, the focus of
the consultations tended to be on such issues as interest rates, money supply,
government debt, inflation, and the current account of the balance of
payments. The scope of these discussions were also somewhat constrained
by Article IV which requires that the IMF "respect the domestic social and
political policies of members, and in applying these principles .

.

. pay due

regard to the circumstances of members."8 5 The IMF has interpreted this
provision as a prohibition against considering political factors in its
operations. 86
The par value system also operated to limit the range of conditions that
the IMF would attach to the financial support it offered to its Member
States.8 7 Under a par value system, the exchange rate is the primary anchor
for the economy. This meant that, except in exceptional circumstances,88
the burden of adjustment fell on the domestic economy of countries with
balance of payments disequilibria.8 9 Consequently, the IMF conditions
could be limited to those macroeconomic variables-government debt,
84. EDWARDS, supra note 12.
85. IMF Articles, supra note 12, art. IV, sec. 3(b).

86. Joseph Gold, Political Considerations Are Prohibited by Articles of Agreement When the
Fund Considers Requests for Use of Resources, IMF SURVEY, May 23, 1983, at 146; see also
Gianviti, supra note 24. It should be noted that the language of the IMF's Article IV is less
restrictive than the political prohibition in the Bank's Articles. This suggests that the IMF's
Articles provide broader scope for developing a human rights policy than the Bank's.
87. Pursuant to Article V, the IMF must ensure that its Member States use its funds in
accordance with the IMF's purposes and thatthe Member State will be able to resell the funds to
the IMF within a relatively short period of time. IMF Articles, supra note 12, art. V, sec. 2. In
order to execute these requirements the IMF attaches specific performance-related conditions
to the use of its financing facilities. These conditions form the basis of IMF conditionality.
For a discussion of IMF Conditionality, see, e.g., JOSEPH GOLD, CONDITIONALITY (IMF
Pamphlet Series No. 31, 1979); MANUEL GUITIAN, FUND CONDITIONALITY: EVOLUTION OF
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 38, 1981). For case studies on
conditionality, see, e.g., IMF CONDITIONALITY (John Williamson ed., 1983); CHERYL PAYER,
THE DEBT TRAP: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE THIRD W ORLD (1974).
88. See supra note 83. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 12.
89. See JEFFREY D. SACHS & FELIPE LARRAIN B., MACROECONOMICS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (1993).
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money supply, inflation, budget deficits-that were directly relevant to the
attainment of a sustainable balance of payments position, based on a
currency with a relatively fixed value. The scope of the issues discussed in
each Member State's letter of intent could also be limited to these
macroeconomic issues. 90
In this regard, it should be recognized that the IMF was concerned
primarily with the actual attainment of these macroeconomic goals. It only
had a secondary interest in how the Member State reached these targets.
Consequently, the precise methods used to reach these goals could be left to
the discretion of the Member State. This tended to impose §ome constraint
on the IMF's ability to intervene in the policymaking processes of its
Member States. 91
C. The Evolution in the IMFs Operations

1. The End of the Par Value System
The collapse of the par value system in 1971 changed this relatively
simple picture. 92 The par value system was replaced with a marketoriented exchange rate system which allows participating States to let their
currencies fluctuate in value. 93 In such a floating exchange rate system, the
exchange rate becomes only one of the many economic variables that can
influence the country's balance of payments. Floating exchange rates
allow a country to correct a balance of payments problem by making
adjustments either in the value of its currency or in its domestic economy. 94
This change expanded the range of issues that the IMF needed to
address in its Article IV consultations with its Member States. For example,
because such issues as labor, health, and agricultural policies can directly
90. In order to utilize the resources of the IMF, a Member State must submit a letter, known as

letter of intent to the Managing Director of the Fund. This letter contains a description of the
policies the Member State intends to follow t correct its balance of payments problems. For
examples of letters of intent, see THE IMF AND GHANA: THE CONFIDENTIAL RECORD 61 (Eboe

Hutchful ed., 1987) (letter from Ghana); EDWARDS, supra note 12 (letter from India);
KATHLEEN BURK & ALEC CAIRNCROSS, 'GOODBYE GREAT BRITAIN': THE 1976 IMF CRISIS
229 (1992) (letter from United Kingdom).

91. The efficacy of these constraints is open to debate. See, e.g., PAYER, supra note 87; BURK &
CAIRNCROSS, supra note 90; THE IMF AND GHANA: THE CONFIDENTIAL RECORD, supra note
90.
92. See MARGARET GARRITSEN DE VRIES, THE IMF IN A CHANGING WORLD 1945-1985 (1986).
93. The market-oriented exchange rate system was enacted by the Second Amendment to the
IMF Articles in April, 1978. The Second Amendment also prohibited a Member State from
basing its exchange rate on gold. See JOSEPH GOLD, USE, CONVERSION, AND EXCHANGE OF
CURRENCY UNDER THE SECOND AMENDMENT OF THE FUND'S ARTICLES (1978); see also
GOLD, supra note 83.
94. SACHS & LARRAIN, supra note 89.
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affect the value of a country's currency and its ability to adjust to changes in
its balance of payments, the IMF needs to consider all these issues in its
surveillance of its Member States' monetary policies. In fact, over time the
IMF has found it necessary to expand the range of issues included in its
consultations. The result is that today, during Article IV consultations, the
IMF may discuss such issues as the level of military expenditures,
environmental issues, governance issues, and social safety nets (which
95
amount to welfare, housing, and unemployment policies).
The broad scope of the Article IV consultations suggests that the IMF can
exert influence over the human rights situation in Member States.
Discussions between the IMF and the Member State about such issues as
labor policies, health care, and social security can influence economic and
social rights in the State. Similarly, when the senior staff of the IMF talks
both publicly and privately about the importance of the rule of law and good
governance to development, they can influence the state of civil and
96
political rights in Member States.
The extent of the IMF's influence will vary depending on the identity of
the Member State. If the State has a healthy economy or is rich enough that it
is unlikely to need the resources of the IMF, it is free to accept or reject the
IMF's views. On the other hand, poor States or those States that are using or
expect to use the IMFs financing facilities can not treat the IMF's advice so
dispassionately. Only at a theoretical level do these States have the same
capacity as the rich Member States to accept or reject the IMF's advice.
Consequently, the IMF tends to have much greater influence over the
policies of poorer States than over richer States.
2. The Economic Crisesof the 1970s and 1980s
The oil and debt crises of the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s also
caused changes in the operations of the IMF. These crises resulted in a shift
in the identity of the countries that make the most extensive use of the
services and facilities of the IMF. Prior to these crises, the primary users of
the IMF's financing services were industrialized countries. Since the

95. See, e.g., SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF THE IMF'S POLICY DIALOGUE, (IMF Pamphlet Series
No. 47), excerpted in IMF SURVEY, Apr. 3, 1995, at 97; Robert Brauning, Summit Sets Standard
for Social Policies, IMF SURVEY, Apr. 3, 1995, at 101 (quoting speech of IMF Managing
Director Michel Camdessus at Social Summit); Gender Issues in Economic Adjustment
Discussed at U.N. Conference on Women, IMF SURVEY, Sept. 25, 1995, at 286 (speech of IMF
representative KL Burke Dillon at the Beijing Conference on Women) [hereinafter Dillon
Speech].
While the range of issues discussed in the IMF's standby decisions has expanded, the IMF
has not explicitly incorporated the full range of social and human-rights-related issues into
the conditionalities attached to its financing facilities.
96. See supra note 80; see also Limited Mandates, supra note 3, for citations to other IMF
statements on these issues.
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crises the primary users of its services have been developing
advent of these
97
countries.
The change in the IMF's clientele necessarily produced changes in its
operations because the causes of (and the solutions to) the balance of
payments problems of developing countries are not identical to those of
industrialized countries. The balance of payments problems of developing
countries, in part, are attributable to their level of development.
Consequently, their balance of payments problems have structural
dimensions which cannot easily be resolved within the parameters of the
IMF's standard short-term standby arrangement. The IMF responded by
developing longer-term financing facilities, such as the Extended Fund
Facility and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). 98
The longer-term facilities lengthened the time period within which the
IMF expected its adjustment policies to work. As a result, the IMF was able
to change its assumptions about which factors should be treated as fixed and
which as variable in the design of its stabilization and adjustment
programs. Most significantly, the IMF relaxed its assumptions about the
fixed nature of the supply side of a country's economy. 99 This has enabled
the IMF to begin including in its conditionality policies some measures
designed to produce changes in the Member State's production profile.' 0 0
A necessary consequence of this change is that the IMF, when deciding
how to incorporate supply-side issues into its policies and programs, has
begun to pay close attention to the speed at which, and the extent to which
people in the country can actually make changes in the production side of
the economy. This requires some analysis of the economic, social, and
cultural impediments in the Member State.
As the discussion above illustrates, the change in the IMF's clientele
has forced the IMF to address the social, cultural, and governance features
of its Member State's political economy. 01 ' The result of these developments
is that today almost all IMF standby and ESAF arrangements include
97. See DE VRIES, supra note 92; MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 79; BRETTON
WOODS COMMISSION, supra note 79.
98. For IMF publications that discuss the ESAF and EFF, see TREASURER'S DEPARTMENT,
supra note 13. For a discussion of the history of the IMF, see DE VRIES, supra note 92, and
HOOKE, supra note 13.
99. In its standard twelve- to eighteen-month standby arrangements, the IMF tends to assume
that the country has very limited ability to increase the amount or the range of goods and
services it produces. Consequently, its conditionalities tend to require the country to correct its
balance of payments position by decreasing the level of demand in the domestic economy. See
GOLD, supra note 87; GUITIAN, supra note 87.
100. See GOLD, supra note 87; IMF CONDITIONALITY, supra note 87; GUITIAN, supranote 87.
101 See, e.g., SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF THE IMF'S POLICY DIALOGUE, supra note 95;
Brauning, supra note 95; Dillon Speech, supra note 95; see also Limited Mandates, supra note
3; RobertS. Browne, Alternatives to the International Monetary Fund, in BEYOND BRETTON
W OODS 57 (John Cavanagh et al. eds., 1994).
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discussions of social safety nets and market-oriented reforms. 0 2 In
addition, IMF officials talk about the importance of transparent and
10 3
accountable governance and of the rule of law to economic development.
D. The Human Rights Implications of the IMF's Operations
1. Limits on the IMF's Influence
The extent of the IMF's influence over human rights is more limited
than the Bank's. There are several reasons for this. The first is that the IMF
is a monetary, not a development institution. Even though its operations
focus on developing countries and their problems, its primary focus still
remains on macroeconomic, and in particular, monetary issues. It is less
involved than the Bank at the micro-level of the economy, which is the level
that the policies and operations of the IFIs most directly affect the human
rights situation of the citizens of their Member States.
The second reason for the IMF's more limited human rights influence
is that the IMF tends to operate with a much shorter time horizon than the
Bank. This is particularly pertinent for human rights issues, which tend to
require longer periods for change than do the issues usually focused on by
the IMF. Consequently, there is a temptation for the IMF to treat human
rights issues as fixed during the period in which the IMF program will be
04
implemented.
Even though the IMF has less influence than the Bank, the IMF still
exerts some influence over its Member States' human rights situations
through its Article IV consultation process and through its use of
conditionalities attached to its financing facilities. Thus, like the Bank, it
needs a human rights policy that can inform all the stakeholders in its
operations about what they can expect from the IMF in this regard.' 0 5
E. The Protectionof Human Rights
The third issue relating to the IMF's human rights responsibilities i n
its operations is that the IMF, as a subject of international law, has some
responsibility to help protect the citizens in its Member States from human
rights abuses. It cannot be indifferent to situations in which human rights
102. This can be deduced from a review of the press releases that announce the IMF Board of
Executive Directors' standby decisions. These press releases are published in the IMF Survey.
103. See, e.g., Brauning, supra note 95.
104. Even in longer-term facilities, the precise performance criteria on which IMF financing
is conditioned are only established approximately on a twelve-month basis. See TREASURER'S
DEPARTMENT, supra note 13, at 83-86 (describing Extended Fund Facilities and ESAFs)
105. See infra Part V. for further discussion of this issue.
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abuses have become so serious as to cause monetary consequences. For
example, during the 1980s, the IMF was forced to recognize that the
systematic abuses caused by South Africa's apartheid policy had adverse
effects on its ability to meet its obligations as a Member of the IMF. As a
result the IMF was forced to limit South Africa's access to the resources and
10 6
services of the IMF.
It should be noted that the IMF faces a more difficult situation in this
regard than the Bank. There are three reasons for this. First, as the
manager of the international monetary system, the IMF must balance its
responsibilities to the citizens of the violating State against its
responsibilities to the other stakeholders in the international monetary
system. Consequently, it cannot easily impose sanctions on a State that
violates human rights if this would have a substantial adverse effect on the
international monetary system.
Second, the IMF has fewer options than the Bank for dealing with
human rights abuses. Because the IMF provides financing for general
balance of payments support rather than for specific projects, 10 7 it cannot
easily direct the flow of the financing. Consequently its only option when
faced with a serious human rights problem is to either deal with the State
purely on the basis of its monetary situation or to impose sanctions on the
State.
Third, the Articles of Agreement constrain the IMF's ability to use
sanctions. The Articles require the IMF to make its financing facilities
available to any Member State in good standing who is suffering the type of
balance of payments problem that the facility was established to help
correct.' 0 8 A member is in "good standing" if it is performing all the
obligations of membership in the IMF.10 9 These obligations, as stipulated in
the Articles of Agreement, do not include human rights performance." 0
It should be noted that the Articles do not, however, preclude the IMF
from raising serious human rights issue in its Article IV consultations
with its Member States."' It can justify doing so on the grounds that poor
human rights performance can have an adverse effect on the State's

106. See Jim Morell, A Billion Dollars for South Africa, INT'L POL'Y REP., Apr. 1983, at 1;
Morell, A Victory over Apartheid, INT'L POL'Y REP., Apr. 1984, at 1. [hereinafter both Morell
articles referred to as International Policy Papers]; see also Daniel D. Bradlow, Debt,
Development and Democracy: Lessons from South Africa,12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 647 (1991).
107. See EDWARDS, supra note 12, at 12; GOLD, supra note 87.
108. See Joseph Gold, Uniformity as a Legal Principle of the International Monetary Fund, 7
LAW. & POL'Y INTL BUS. 765 (1975).

109. Id.
110. See IMF Articles, supra note 12.
111. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing interpretation of Article IV).
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balance of payments position. n 2 This follows from the fact that a poor
human rights situation has economic costs that affect the allocation and
utilization of resources, including human resources.
The final human rights issue that the IMF must address is the issue of
its human rights responsibilities in regard to its own internal operating
policies and procedures. The IMF's institutional human rights obligations
will be discussed with those of the Bank in the next section of this Article.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

A. Description of the Issues
As subjects of international law, the IFIs are required to ensure that
their operating rules and procedures conform to the standards of
international law and do not undermine the efforts of their Member States
to satisfy their own international legal obligations. This suggests that the
IFIs' operating rules and procedures should be transparent, should provide
affected parties with a meaningful opportunity to participate in the design
and implementation of their operations, and should hold IFI staff
accountable for their actions and decisions.
In recent years, both the Bank and the IMF have experienced problems
with their operating rules and procedures." 3 An internal investigation into
the Bank's management of its loan portfolio found problems that were
attributable, at least in part, to deficiencies in the operational procedures of
112. The U.S. Congress used this logic in deciding to order the U.S. Executive Director at the
IMFtovote against IMF Financing for South Africa during the 1980s. See 22 U.S.C. § 286aa
(1988); see also Bradlow, supra note 106 (discussing U.S. policy towards IMF financing for
South Africa); International Policy Papers, supra note 106.
113. See Moises Naim, The World Bank: Its Role, Governance and Organizational Culture,
in BRETTON WOODS COMMISSION, supra note 79, at C-273; Bradlow, supra note 78; Lori Udall,
The World Bank's Revised Information Policy and New Inspection Panel: Public
Acountability or Public Relations, in BEYOND BRETTON WOODS, supra note 101, at 145; Bruce
Rich, The World Bank: Institutional Problems and Possible Reforms, Memorandum from
Bruce Rich to Interested NGOs, IGC Conferences, Researchers, Bank Watchers, etc. (March
1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Rich Memorandum]; Report of the Portfolio
Management Task Force, Effective Implementation: Key to Development Impact [hereinafter
Wapenhans Report]; SARDAR SAROVAR, supra note 43; Jeffrey Sachs, Will the Banks Block
Debt Relief?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1989, at A25; Oversight of the IMF and World Bank,
Meeting of a Multinational Group of ParliamentariansInvolved in Oversight of the IMF and
World Bank Before the Subcomm. on International Development, Finance, and Monetary
Policy Trade of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong., 2nd
Sess., 26-28, 47-48 (1994) (statement of Jeffrey Sachs, Professor of Economics) [hereinafter
Inter-Parliamentary Meeting]; Testimony to Subcomm. on Development, Finance, Trade,
and Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong, 1st
Sess., 8-12, 51-52 (1996) (Statement of Jeffrey Sachs, Professor of Economics); Jeffrey Sachs,
Towards Glasnost in the IMF,CHALLENGE, May-June 1994, at 4.
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the Bank.1 1 4 The IMF has also been criticized for its handling of such
situations as the 1994 currency crisis in Mexico and the complex problems
resulting from the breakup of the former Soviet Union.1 1 5 The IMF's
problems are also attributable in part to deficiencies in its operating
practices .116

The reasons the IFIs have experienced these problems are not hard to
find. Historically, both institutions have not been easily accessible to the
public; both have been reluctant to make adequate amounts of information
publicly available in a timely manner; and both have been insufficiently
accountable to those who are most directly affected by their actions. In
addition, staff incentives in both institutions are more responsive to their
prior narrower range of activities and the technical issues that arose from
them than to the broad ranging and complex policy choices that the
11 7
institutions now have to make.
In the case of the Bank, this created what the Wapenhans report called a
"loan approval" culture which encouraged Bank staff to lend money. This
was accompanied by an institutional bias in favor of large, complex
projects rather than smaller, simpler projects which, while more labor and
resource intensive, are also more amenable to public participation and tend
to be more directly responsive to the needs of their intended beneficiaries.
Similarly, the IMF rewards staff for their technical proficiency rather
than for taking the time to engage in the wide-ranging consultations and
exchanges of information necessary to ensure that the IMF's operations are
transparent and sensitive to the interests of those who will be affected by
them. In this regard, the IMF tends to limit its discussions to a small
number of government ministries. The Articles require the IMF to
establish either the Central Bank or the Ministry of Finance as its contact
point with the government. 1 8 There is no obligation on the IMF to broaden
its contacts beyond these two governmental actors.
114. Wapenhans Report, supra note 113.
116. Sachs, Inter-Parliamentary Meeting, supra note 113; BRETTON WOODS COMMISSION,
supra note 79; FIFTY YEARS AFTER, supra note 79; MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra
note 79.
116. Inter-Parliamentary Meeting, supra note 113 (stating, inter-alia, that it is harder to ge
information from the IMF than from the CIA).
117. See Wapenhans Report, supra note 113; Rich, supra note 113; BRETrON WOODS
COMMISSION, supra note 79; FIFTY YEARS AFTER, supra note 79; MANAGING THE WORLD
ECONOMY, supra note 79. See generally PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT: EFFECTIVE
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Jo Marie Griesgraber & Bernard
Gunther eds., 1995); RETHINKING BRETTON WOODS: TOWARDS EQUITABLE, SUSTAINABLE
AND PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT (Jo Marie Griesgraber & Bernard Gunther eds., 1994)
[hereinafter RETHINKING BRETTON WOODS]; THE W ORLD BANK: LENDING ON A GLOBAL
SCALE (Jo Marie Griesgraber & Bernard Gunther eds., 1996); THE WORLD'S MONETARY
SYSTEM: TOWARD STABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Jo
Marie Griesgraber & Bernard Gunther eds., 1996).
118. IMF Articles, supra note 12, art. V, sec. 1.
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B. The Response of the Bank
The Bank has begun to address these problems. First, it has undertaken
an extensive participation learning exercise and is now determining how
to incorporate public participation into all phases of its project cycle. 1 9
Second, it has adopted a new information disclosure policy that increases
the amount of public information available about Bank projects. 20 Third,
the Bank has substantially expanded and formalized its relations with
NGOs.' 2i As a result, the Bank President requires all Bank Resident
Representatives to hold regular meetings with the NGOs in their respective
countries. Fourth, the Bank has established an Inspection Panel that
provides private actors harmed by the Bank's failure to abide by its own
rules and procedures with a mechanism for holding the Bank publicly
to incorporate more
accountable. 22 Finally, the Bank has taken steps
23
extensive social assessments into its operations.
The Bank is also addressing the staff incentive problem by changing
its operating practices to emphasize the quality rather than the quantity of
Bank-funded projects. In addition, the Bank is encouraging its staff to
ensure that borrowers and other stakeholders feel a sense of "ownership" i n
Bank-funded projects. The Bank hopes that these changes will make
projects more responsive to the interests of those who are the project's
119. PARTICIPATION SOURCEBOOK, supra note 11; BHUVAN BHATNAGAR & AUBREY C.
WILLIAMS, PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT AND THE WORLD BANK (World Bank
Discussion Papers No. 183, 1992); see also Robert Picciotto & Rachel Weaving, A New Project
Cycle for the World Bank?, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 1994, at 42.
120. See WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK POLICY ON DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
(1994). The Bank has created a Project Information Document which is issued for each project
now under consideration at the Bank. This document is available from the Public
Information Center. See OPERATIONAL MANUAL, supra note 8, B.P. 17.50, for a compete
listing of the documents that the Bank now makes publicly available through the Public
Information Center.
121. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations, in
SHIHATA, supra note 5.
122. World Bank Inspection Panel, Res. 93-10, International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Res. 93-6, International Development Association, Sept. 22, 1993; IBRAHIM F.I.
SHIHATA, THE W ORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL (1994); DAVID HUNTER & JAY UDALL, THE
WORLD BANK'S NEW INSPECTION PANEL: W ILL IT INCREASE THE BANK'S
ACCOUNTABILITY? (Center for International Environmental Law, Brief No. 1, April 1994);
Bradlow, supra note 78; Daniel D. Bradlow & Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank's
New Inspection Panel: A Constructive Step in the Transformation of the International Legal
Order, 54 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLADISCHED 0FFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT
[HEIDELBERG JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 392,554 (1994).
123. See World Bank, Guidelines for Incorporating Social Assessment and Participation into
Bank Projects (Draft Memorandum, Feb. 14, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter World
Bank Guidelines on Social Assessment]; Peter Montague, World Bank Loan for Pakistan,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1995, at 3 (Bank has approved loan for dam project in Pakistan that is
first project in which an independent panel of social scientists have helped guide project
preparation.)

Spring 1996]

TEE WORLD

BANK, THE IMF, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

intended beneficiaries. It expects these changes to enhance the
sustainability of the projects. 124 The Bank has also begun to broaden the
focus of its operations from the project to the country level. This should
make it easier for the Bank and the country to shift funds from problem
projects to the country's most effective development projects and programs.
Each of these changes is subject to criticism. For example, the
information disclosure policy has been criticized for not providing the
public with adequate information at a meaningful time in the project cycle.
In addition, while information is publicly available in Washington, it is
not easily available to people in the Bank's Borrower States, who are, after
all, those most directly affected by the Bank's actions. Consequently, some
critics argue, the new policy has not materially helped those most
vulnerable to, and most directly affected by, the Bank's operations. These
interests and promote
vulnerable groups still find it difficult to protect their
125
a sustainable and equitable development process.
While these criticisms raise important issues, they should not
undermine the potential advances created by the Bank's actions. The
changes in the Bank's operating procedures have created opportunities for
stakeholders who have the requisite resources to take advantage of them.
These stakeholders can use the Bank's information disclosure policies,
participation requirements, and Inspection Panel to engage the Bank in a
dialogue about human rights and other relevant issues. In addition, they
can use these changes in the Bank's operating procedures to increase the
likelihood that the Bank's operations will be designed and implemented in
a way that is sensitive to the human rights issues that may arise in the
course of Bank-funded projects and programs.
C. The Situation of the IMF
The IMF has moved more slowly than the Bank to address the
challenges posed by its expanded scope of operations. It has begun to make
some efforts to communicate with NGOs; however, it has not yet formalized
a process for such communication. In fact, the IMF does not appear to have
any explicit staff requirements relating to consultations with NGOs. As a
result, the IMF is able to engage in substantial and wide-ranging
in
policymaking consultations with its Member States without engaging
126
meaningful consultations with interested nongovernmental actors.
124. WORLD BANK, GETTING RESULTS: THE WORLD BANK'S AGENDA FOR IMPROVING
DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS (1993).

125. Udall, supra note 113, at 145. For criticism of the other changes in Bank operations, see
Bradlow, supra note 78, at 563; Naim, supra note 113; Udall, supra note 113; Udall & Hunter,
supra note 122; Rich Memorandum, supra note 113.
126. Since it tends to focus its attention on the Finance Ministries and the Central Banks in its
Member States, the IMF is also able to make policies without necessarily consulting all
interested line ministries in the country's government.
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The IMF has also made minimal efforts to publicly disclose
information about its activities. To date, its most significant attempt to
develop better information flows was to suggest that its Member States
publicly release the reports prepared at the end of the Article IV
consultations. 127 Nevertheless, the IMF remains such a closed institution
that one commentator was moved to note that it is often harder to get
128
information from the IMF than from the CIA.
In addition, stakeholders in the IMF's operations have no real means
for holding the IMF directly accountable for its actions. Unlike the Bank,
the IMF does not have a post hoc independent audit department that can
provide the directors and governors of the IMF with an independent review
of the efficacy of its operations. 129 In addition, it has no formal mechanism,
like the Bank's Inspection Panel, for handling complaints from non-state
actors who allege that they have suffered or are threatened with material
harm caused by a failure in the IMF's operating procedures.
D. Conclusion
The above description of the institutional responses of the IFIs suggests
that they are failing to live up to the same standards of good governance that
they themselves advocate to their Member States. 130
V. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE CONTENTS OF AN IFI HUMAN
RIGHTS POLICY
A. The Need for a Human Rights Policy
The Bank and the IMF both lack adequate policies for dealing, with the
human rights implications of their operations. While the Bank has taken
measures to address both the operational and the institutional dimensions
of the human rights impact of its operations, it has not yet developed a
coherent and publicly available human rights policy. Its present human
rights policies must be deduced from the writings and statements of its
127. Switzerland established the precedent of releasing these reports. It should be noted that the
IMF originally did not support the Swiss initiative.
128. Sachs, Inter-Parliamentary Hearings, supra note 113.
129. The Bank's Operations Evaluation Department conducts post hoc reviews of Bank
operations. It is independent in ti sense that it reports directly to the Bank's Board of
Directors and not tothe Bank's Management.
130. It should be noted that all these criticisms are the subject of ongoing international NGO
campaigns. See, e.g., RETHINKING BRETTON WOODS, supra note 117; FIFTY YEARS IS
ENOUGH: THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND (Kevin Danaher ed., 1994).
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management and staff, and from its actions. 131 These statements and
actions, however, do not provide adequate clarity. They tend to
acknowledge that human rights are important to development and,
therefore, to the work of the Bank; however, by emphasizing the constraints
on the Bank's ability to deal with human rights issues, these statements
132
suggest that many human rights issues are outside the Bank's mandate.
Thus, even when the Bank appears to base its decisions on human rights
grounds-for example denying funding to countries such as Kenya or
Malawi under former President Banda-it tends to emphasize the economic
rationale for its decision, thereby implying that human rights are outside
133
its mandate.
The IMFs policy on human rights is even harder to detect. The
primary evidence of an IMF position on human rights is found in the
writings and statements of its representatives. Like the Bank, the IMF
sends contradictory signals in these statements. For example, in his public
speeches, the Managing Director has recognized the importance of human
rights to the development process. At the same time, he and other authorities
on the IMF have also suggested that the IMF can not play a role in promoting
human rights.134 However, they do not explain why, if human rights are so
important, the IMF can ignore them in its operations and policies.
The result is that to outside observers the decisions the IFIs make when
confronted with human rights issues appear to be ad hoc and somewhat
arbitrary. In fact, the IFIs seem to use the constraints imposed by their
Articles to justify extending the scope of their operations to areas they want
to deal with and as an excuse to avoid those human rights problems they do
not wish to address. 135 This situation makes it difficult for the various
13. See SHIHATA, supra note 5; Wolfensohn, supra note 2; GOVERNANCE, supra note 51;
UPDATE ON GOVERNANCE, supra note 51 (discussing lending decisions regarding China

after Tienamin Square, and Malawi and Kenya in the late 1980s and early 1990s). For earlier
evidence, see Broches Statement, supra note 35 (discussing lending decisions regarding South
Africa and Portugal in 1966); Victoria E. Marmorstein, World Bank Power to Consider
Human Rights, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 113 (1978). It should be noted that the Bank's Board of
Executive Directors has not made all the Bank's General Counsel's legal opinions relevant to
this issue publically available.
132. For the most recent example of this, see Shihata, Democracy and Development, supra note
2.
133. GOVERNANCE, supra note 51; UPDATE ON GOVERNANCE, supra note 51.
134. See Brauning, supra note 95, at 101; Dillon speech, supra note 95, at 287; Excerpts from
closing address by ManagingDirector Michel Camdessus at 1994 Annual Meeting of the IMF,
IMF SURVEY, Oct. 17, 1994, at 328; Excerpts from closing address by Managing Director
Michel Camdessus at 1995Annual Meeting of the IMF, IMF SURVEY, Oct. 23, 1995, at 334-35.
Joseph Gold states: "The swimmer who goes out too far may seem to be waving but he is
drowning. The Fund that swims out too far even, in a moral cause, will risk drowning. It will
have lost the full confidence of its members. It will be less able to promote universal prosperity.
That task is the Fund's moral cause." Gold, supra note 86, at 148.
135. For example, the Bank has not allowed its political prohibitions to preclude it from
considering such issues as gender equality and special treatment for indigenous people and
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stakeholders to know what they can expect from the IFIs in terms of
promoting and protecting human rights. It also makes it difficult for the IFI
staff to know how they are expected to handle the human rights issues that
arise in the course of their duties. Finally, the lack of a human rights policy
complicates the international community's efforts to hold the IFIs
accountable for their human-rights-related decisions. In order to avoid
these problems, therefore, the IFIs each need to develop a principled and
transparent human rights policy.
B. The Content of an IFI Human Rights Policy
An IFI human rights policy should address both the operational and
institutional human rights issues raised in the course of the IFIs
operations. These two dimensions to the human rights challenges facing
the IFIs can be further divided into the following four issues: (1) the
interpretation of the constraints imposed by their Articles of Agreement, (2)
the IFIs' responsibility to promote human rights, (3) the IFIs' responsibility
to protect the planned beneficiaries of their operations against human rights
abuses, and (4) the IFIs' responsibilities in regard to their internal
operating policies and procedures. Each of these issues will be discussed
separately.
1. The ConstraintsImposed by the Articles of Agreement
Obviously, each IFIs' human rights policy must be consistent with its
Articles of Agreement. This means that the Bank should develop a human
rights policy that is consistent with the political prohibition in its Articles
which state that the Bank should not be influenced by the "political
character" of its Member States.13 6 To date, the Bank has not formally
defined the term political character or explained the political
considerations that are outside its mandate. 13 7 Instead the Bank has stated
other minorities, but it has refused to explicitly consider human rights issues when extending
credit to countries with well-documented human rights problems like China, Indonesia or
Mexico. GOVERNANCE, supra note 51, UPDATE ON GOVERNANCE, supra note 51. Similarly, in
the early 1980s, the IMF refused to explicitly consider the human rights implications of
apartheid when making financing available to South Africa. It did, however, later stop

assisting apartheid South Africa. Bradlow, supra note 106, at 656; International Policy Papers,
supra note 106.
136. IBRD Articles, supra note 24, art. IV, sec. 10; see also, id. art. III, sec. 5 (b).
137. The Bank's General Counsel in his legal opinion on governance has provided a general
definition of "politics," but not "political character," the term used in Article IV, section 10. His
definition ("politics" relates to the art and practice of running a country or governing) is too
general to be operationally useful in defining the outer limits of the Bank's jurisdiction.
Many factors that the Bank treats as "economic" are encompassed within this definition of
"politics" (for example, reform of the public sector enhances the environment for the private
sector). See Shihata, Opinion on Governance, supra note 35, at 26.
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that it can take political considerations or the political character of the
Borrower State into account in its decisions when these considerations have
a "direct and obvious" economic effect.1 s8
The Bank's
General
Counsel has identified
four political
considerations that the Bank can treat as falling within the scope of its
mandate. These are (1) the binding decisions of the U.N. Security Council
relating to peace and security; (2) international sanctions affecting the
economic prospects of a potential borrowing country; (3) an escalation of
armed conflict that affects the viability of Bank projects and the safety of
Bank personnel; and (4) where it can be unequivocally shown that political
1 39
phenomena have demonstrably adverse economic consequences.
As discussed above, all human rights can be shown to have direct and
obvious economic effects.1 40 Consequently, the political prohibition should
not be interpreted so broadly as to preclude the Bank's involvement with
internationally recognized human rights. Rather it should be construed
narrowly to only preclude the Bank from interfering in domestic partisan
political affairs. The Bank should abstain from considering issues such as
which political party or faction should hold political power, who should win
specific political debates, or which official should be appointed to which
post.' 4 ' In addition, any purely domestic affairs that have no relation to the
international responsibilities of the Bank should be excluded from the scope
of the Bank's mandate.
The IMF faces a weaker political constraint than the Bank. The IMF's
Articles only require it to "pay due regard" to domestic, social, and political
affairs in its Article IV consultations. 42 This provision has been
interpreted to preclude the IMF from basing its operations on political
considerations. 43 A literal reading of this provision, however, does not
preclude the IMF from having its own opinion on these issues and from
acting on the basis of its own perception of the member's political situation.
The provision merely requires the IMF to treat the Member State's
perception of these issues seriously. Thus, the Articles provide the IMF with
the flexibility it needs to take human rights considerations into account in
its operations. The IMF could therefore facilitate the development of a
human rights policy by explicitly adopting an interpretation of its Articles
that allows it to take internationally recognized human rights standards
into account in its Article IV consultations.

138. See supra Part II.E.1. for more detailed discussion of this issue.
139. See Shihata, Opinion on Governance, supra note 35.
140. See supra Part II.E.1.
141. This interpretation would be consistent with a liberal reading of the General Counsel's
Legal Opinion on Governance. Shihata, Opinion on Governance, supra note 35.
142. See IMF Articles, supra note 12, art. IV.
143. See GOLD, supra note 24; Gianviti, supra note 24.
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A final point to note in regard to interpreting the political constraints on
the IFIs is that they are institutions subject to international law. 14 4 This

means they have an obligation to act in conformity with international law
and to ensure that their operations do not undermine the ability of other
subjects of international law to act in conformity with their own legal
obligations. In this sense, the IFIs should see the consideration of human
rights in 'the course of their operations as a requirement and not as a
possible political consideration that is outside their mandates.
2. Promotion of Human Rights
The IFIs' responsibility in regard to the promotion of human rights is to
ensure that the design of all their operations enhances the human rights
situation of those affected by their operations. While this principle is easy to
state, it is extremely difficult to apply. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify
three indicators that can help determine if an IFI operation will promote
human rights. 145 These are (1) the level of public participation in the
operation, (2) the expected impact of the operation on human rights, and (3)
the degree of public accountability of the decisionmakers in the specific
operation.
a. Participationis the First Human Rights Indicator
The first indicator of a human-rights-promoting operation is
significant stakeholder participation. Achieving this participation
requires identifying all the stakeholders in the operation. The stakeholders
are those groups affected both directly and indirectly by the proposed
operation. Their role in the design and implementation of an operation is a
critical factor in determining whether or not the project promotes human
rights. Consequently, the IFIs should ensure that each group of stakeholders
is able to participate in the design and implementation of the IFIs'
operation. The extent of their participation should be related to how directly
and substantially the operation affects them.
Stakeholders can adequately participate in the operation only if they
possess sufficient freedom of association and expression, and have access
to sufficient information to make informed decisions about the operation.
Consequently, this first indicator relates to freedom of expression, freedom
of association, and access to information pertaining to the operation.
The IFIs, when evaluating performance on this criteria, must consider
more than the existing legal regime in the Borrower State. They must also
.144. See BOWETT, supra note 70; FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING (2d ed. 1993); SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 70.

145. This discussion is based in part on the World Bank's guidelines on social impact
assessments and the work of Tomashevski on human rights impact assessments. See
KATARINA TOMASHEVSKI, DEVELOPMENT

AID AND HUMAN RIGHTS REVISITED (1993);

World Bank Guidelines on Social Assessment, supra note 123.
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consider whether stakeholders, in fact, feel able to exercise their rights.
Stakeholders, even though they have the legal right to do so, may feel unable
to freely express their opinions for a number of reasons. These include a
governmentally created climate that chills free speech and freedom of
association, the de facto inability of stakeholders to obtain adequate
information on the proposed IFI operations, and the lack of capacity to
participate. This lack of capacity can be caused by cultural barriers such as
gender relations and the status of minority groups in the society.
This means that the Bank should only decide a project meets
satisfactory human rights standards if it is confident that the stakeholders
in the project in fact are able to freely express their opinions about the project
and to organize themselves to advocate for their interests. In addition, the
Bank needs to be sure that the stakeholders have access to sufficient
information to make an informed decision about the project.
Similarly, the IMF should only find that a standby arrangement
promotes human rights if it is satisfied that the citizens 146 of the particular
State have an adequate opportunity to express their views on the policies that
the standby arrangement will support. An IMF finding that citizens are
provided with an adequate opportunity to express their opinions should be
based on their ability to organize, the level of freedom of speech in the
country, and the ability of citizens to obtain information on the proposed
policies.
In cases where they find problems that affect the ability of stakeholders
to actually participate in the project, the IFIs should consider what steps they
can take to facilitate participation by all stakeholders. For example, the
IFIs could create a mechanism through which stakeholders or their
authorized representatives could communicate their views directly to the
IFIs.147
b. The Expected Human Rights Impact is the Second Indicator
The second indicator of a human-rights-promoting operation is that the
expected impact of the operation should be to improve the human rights
conditions of all stakeholders. This implies that the design of such
operations should include an assessment of the expected change in the
human rights condition of the stakeholders over the duration of the
operation.
It is clearly easier to conceptualize and describe this indicator than to
operationalize it. This difficulty can be overcome, however, if it is
remembered that the primary function of the indicator is to ensure that the

146. IMF standby (or other financing) arrangements

re macroeconomic in focus and,

therefore, affect all the citizens in the particular State.
147. See Limited Mandates, supra note 3, at 429, for further discussion of this point.
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human rights effects of an operation receive adequate attention from the
IFIs.
This indicator therefore requires the IFIs to explicitly identify in their
planning documents which human rights are likely to be affected and to
describe how they will be affected by the operation. For example, in a Bankfunded health project, the Bank will need to identify the impact the project
will have on the health of all stakeholders. In addition, the Bank will have
to identify what other impacts the health project will have on each group of
stakeholders. This means that the IFIs will need to identify who will
receive the other social, political, and economic benefits associated with the
project. These benefits may include jobs, income, and access to political
authorities. In addition, the Bank staff should attempt to assess how the
project might affect the relations between different groups of stakeholders,
such as men and women.
The IMF in its operational planning should also engage in this human
rights impact analysis. It should consider both the short- and long-term
impact of its operations on different social groups and on the relations
between these different groups. While this human rights impact analysis
may be qualitative and not very accurate, it should enable the IMF and other
stakeholders in the operation to assess the likely effects of the proposed
policies. In this sense, the indicator will contribute to IMF operations that
promote human rights in that they are sensitive to the needs of all
stakeholders in the operation, enhance transparency in IMF operations,
and enhance IMF accountability.
In developing a human rights impact analysis the IFIs must deal with
the reality that not all sustainable and equitable operations produce only
positive human rights results. The project may result, for example, in
involuntary resettlement or loss of income for some stakeholders. The
analysis must therefore incorporate some methodology that IFI staff can
utilize to decide when to proceed with an operation that will produce some
adverse human rights consequences. In this regard, the staff can look at the
following criteria: the existence of less harmful alternatives, the duration
of the negative human rights impacts, the adequacy of the opportunity for the
stakeholders who will suffer the negative human rights impacts to
participate in the design and implementation of the project, the availability
of a means for the stakeholders to petition the operation's decisionmakers
for redress of the grievances which arise during the course of the operation,
and the nature and quantity of compensation available to those who suffer
losses as a result of the operation.
There is no doubt that the proposed human rights impact analysis will
complicate the work of the IFIs. Not only is the analysis itself difficult and
time consuming, but its speculative nature is likely to generate
controversy. While these costs are real, they do not outweigh the benefits
provided by undertaking this analysis during the design phase of an
operation. The analysis, which necessarily
will require public
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participation, should stimulate public debate and promote public knowledge
about the proposed operation. Thus, while this analysis may complicate the
design phase of the operation, it should facilitate implementation of the
operation. It should also help ensure that IFI operations are responsive to the
needs of the stakeholders and the constraints of the context within which
they will take place.
It should be noted that a modified version of this approach may be
required in situations of crisis, where time is of the essence and
decisionmakers need to act with discretion to avoid market actions that
would undermine their IFI-supported stabilization strategies. In these cases
more emphasis will need to be placed on post hoc mechanisms, such as
appeals processes, to ensure that all stakeholders are treated fairly. In
addition, a more human rights-sensitive proposal can be applied once the
acute phase of the crisis is over.
c. Accountability is the Third Human Rights Indicator
The third indicator relates to the accountability of the decision makers
in the specific operation. This indicator focuses on both the ability of the
stakeholders to identify the decisionmakers in the operation and on the
stakeholders' access to a mechanism for holding these decisionmakers
accountable. It will be noticed that since the decisionmakers in IFI-funded
operations include IFI staff, this indicator requires the IFIs to assess both
their own accountability to these stakeholders
and that of the
decisionmakers in the Borrower State.
The latter point raises the issue of the acceptable level of IFI
involvement in the affairs of the Member State. In this regard it is useful to
recall that specialized human rights organizations do evaluate the
accountability of decisionmakers in Member States in the course of
reviewing the reports of signatories to the various international human
rights conventions. 148 The IFIs could capitalize on the expertise of these
organizations by either utilizing the information gathered by these
149
organizations or by working with them to conduct their evaluations.
Another aspect of this issue is determining what the IFIs should do when
the Borrower State's methods of accountability are found to be deficient. In
such cases the IFIs could work with the relevant international
organizations and with other interested parties to determine how serious the
deficiencies are and whether the project can achieve its objectives despite
these deficiencies.
In order to ensure adequate accountability, the IFIs also need to
incorporate some post hoc evaluation mechanism into their operations. The
purposes of this mechanism would be to determine if the operations actually
148. See GUIDE TO INTERNATONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE (Hurst Hannum ed., 1984).

149. See Limited Mandates, supra note 3, for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
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produced the expected benefits, and to learn more about what makes for
The
Operation
operations.
successful
human-rights-promoting
Evaluations Department performs this function for the World Bank.
d. The Problem of Non-Ideal Projects
The three indicators discussed above are designed to help the IFIs
identify and produce an ideal human-rights-promoting operation.
However, no operation is likely to achieve a perfect rating on all indicators.
Consequently, the IFIs' human rights policies will need to include some
means for determining what constitutes acceptable derogations from the
ideal situation. Acceptable derogations may be so case specific that it will be
extremely difficult for the IFIs to develop general principles in this regard.
However, in order for their operations to be confidently viewed as human
rights promoting, they will need to publicly and explicitly justify each
operation that derogates in any significant way from the ideal situation.
4. Protection of Human Rights
a. Defining the IFIs"Responsibilities
The IFIs can not be expected to play the leading international role in
protecting the victims of human rights abuses from the state actors
perpetrating these abuses. This responsibility lies with the specialized
international human rights organizations, and with other state and nonstate actors in the international community. The IFIs, however, do have a
responsibility to ensure that their operations do not exacerbate problematic
human rights situations. 150
While the IMF has not publicly addressed this issue, the Bank has made
some relevant statements. The Bank's General Counsel has advised that
the Bank would not be able to undertake operations in countries that are the
target of binding U.N. Security Council decisions relating to peace and
security, in which international sanctions are affecting the economic
prospects of the target country, in which armed conflict threatens the
viability of Bank projects and the safety of Bank personnel, or in which it
can be unequivocally demonstrated that political phenomena have adverse
economic effects. 151 While none of these criteria specifically mention
human rights, they can be interpreted as including situations -with serious
human rights problems. In fact, the Bank's General Counsel has stated that
150. See, e.g., Marmorstein, supra note 131; The Impact of Financial Institutions on the
Realization of Human Rights: Case Study of the InternationalMonetary Fund in Chile,6 B. C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 143 (1986); David Gillies, Human Rights, Democracy and 'Good
Governance': Stretching the World Bank's Policy Frontiers,in THE W ORLD BANK: LENDING
ON A GLOBAL SCALE, supra note 117.
151. See SHIHATA, supra note 5, at 560-61.
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and
an extensive violation of human rights, to the extent that it has a direct
152
obvious economic effect, could become a factor in Bank decisions.
The General Counsel's opinion represents an important advance in the
Bank's acceptance of its obligation to protect human rights. Nevertheless, it
does not go far enough. It does not acknowledge that the Bank has a
responsibility to protect people from human rights abuses that occur as a
direct result of participating in a Bank-funded operation. The Bank needs
to develop a policy for dealing with this situation. It is irresponsible for the
Bank to invite people to participate in its activities and then fail to protect
them when its interventions result in reprisals from the Borrower State or
its agents.
The General Counsel's opinion also fails to give clear guidance on how
the Bank should treat the recommendations and opinions of international
organizations other than the Security Council. For example, it does not
indicate how the Bank should respond to the findings of the United Nations
Human Rights Commission or the regional human rights commissions
that a certain country is experiencing serious human rights problems or is
refusing to respect a ruling of a regional human rights court.
While these recommendations and opinions may not be legally
binding on the Bank, they cannot be ignored. 153 There are two reasons for
this. First, the Bank as a subject of international law has an obligation to
ensure that it does not enhance the ability of other subjects of international
law to ignore binding international norms. Extending financial support to
States that, for example, ignore the rulings of international tribunals, could
facilitate the State's continued efforts to ignore such rulings. Second, a State
that fails to respect the ruling or findings of a human rights tribunal that it
is legally bound to respect may also ignore its other legal obligations,
including those contained in its agreements with the Bank. As a matter of
prudence, therefore, the Bank should refrain from lending to the offending
State.
The IMF's responsibilities to protect human rights are similar to the
Bank's. The IMF, however, has not made any public statements addressing
this issue. In practice, it has been able t avoid some of these issues because
it has made no effort to make its operations participatory. This does not
mean that the IMF has any less obligation than the Bank to become more
participatory or to become more respectful of the recommendations and
opinions of specialized international human rights organizations. It
merely means that the IMF has been less willing than the Bank to take steps
that are designed to meet its obligations to protect human rights.

152. Shihata, Opinion on Governance, supra note 35.
153. This is a complex issue and a full exploration of it is outside the scope of this Article. See
Limited Mandates, supra note 3, for a more detailed discussion of the issue.
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b. The IFI Response to Human Rights Abuses
The next aspect in developing the IFIs' policy to protect human rights is
to define the type of action the IFIs should take to protect people who are
suffering human rights violations. It should be noted that the IFIs'
responses to these situations may be constrained by the political prohibition
in their Articles of Agreement. However, as was discussed above, these
prohibitions should limit their ability to intervene in purely domestic
political issues but not their ability to deal with situations with
international implications, which include cases of significant human
154
rights abuses.
One possibility is for the IFI to work with the offending government
and, where appropriate, international human rights organizations to stop
the abuse. For example, the IMF could raise the human rights issue with the
violating State during the Article IV consultations and make
recommendations on how to deal with the situation. Similarly, the Bank
could make recommendations during the Bank's ongoing policy dialogue
with the Member State.
An alternative, although more controversial approach, would be for the
IFIs to condition any assistance on the correction of human rights
abuses. 155 The sanction attached to this condition could take a number of
forms. For example, the IFIs could deny future requests for financing.
Alternatively, they could suspend existing funding commitments. The
feasibility of the latter approach would depend on the terms of the existing
arrangements between the particular IFI and the Member State.
The Bank does have another option in dealing with human rights
problems. It can limit its operations in the offending State to those activities
which it is satisfied will not facilitate the government's continued human
rights abuses and which will enhance the victims' ability to protect
themselves against the perpetrators of such abuses.
Given the severity of most of these sanctions, they would only be
appropriate for serious human rights abuses. In addition, the Bank should
only impose the harsher sanctions when it is convinced that there is no
possibility to undertake any constructive development activity in the
country. The IMF should contemplate these sanctions when it is convinced
that the State, because its human rights abuses are so extensive, cannot
reasonably be expected to live up to its monetary obligations. Both IFIs
should consult with specialized human rights organizations in reaching
these decisions.

154. See supra Part V.B.1.
155. This is the approach adopted by a number of bilateral aid donors. It is, however, a more
complex approach for the IFIs to adopt because it may lead to charges that the IFIs are promoting
the political agenda of a specific group of countries. See Gillies, supra note 150.
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4. The Institutional Human Rights Issue
The final aspect of the IFIs' human rights policy is ensuring that their
own operating procedures are consistent with international human rights
law. There are four aspects to the IFIs' responsibilities in this regard. First,
the IFIs need to ensure that their own operating practices and procedures
conform to the principles of good governance they advocate to their own
borrowers. Thus their operating rules and procedures should be transparent
all the
and easily understandable to all interested parties. Moreover,
156
operating rules and procedures should be publicly available.
Second, the IFIs need to provide interested parties with the opportunity
for meaningful communication with the IFIs about their operations. For
means
communications"
these purposes, the term "meaningful
communications at a time that will enable the interested parties to
adequately protect their interests in the project. It also means that the IFIs
need to make information about their planned operations publicly available
in a timely fashion.
Third, the IFIs need to provide stakeholders with the means to hold both
institutions accountable for their actions. This requires the IFIs to improve
public access to their internal evaluation reports. It also will require the
IFIs to develop mechanisms, like the Bank's Inspection Panel, that allow
private actors to hold them and their staff accountable for their actions and
decisions.
The fourth aspect to the IFIs' institutional obligations is that they need to
educate their staff about human rights. Such education would sensitize the
staff to the human rights dimensions of the IFIs' operations. This will
assist them in responding to the many difficult human rights issues that
can arise in the course of their work in the IFIs' Member States. These
educational activities should be undertaken in conjunction with the
specialized international human 157rights organizations and the relevant
nongovernmental organizations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The operations of the IFIs, in fact, have a significant impact on the
human rights situation in those Member States that choose to utilize their
services. In order to ensure that they have a positive impact on these human
rights situations, the IFIs need to develop an explicit human rights policy.
This policy should include both a standard for determining when human
rights issues have a sufficient economic impact to be considered part of the
156. Many, but not all, of the Bank's operating rules are available through the Bank's Public

Information Center. The Bank needs to ensure that all the rules are available not only through
the PIC but also from each of its Resident Missions.
157. See Limited Mandates, supra note 3, for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
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IFIs' mandate, and a definition of the term "political" so that all
stakeholders can identify what issues are outside the IFIs' mandate. Such a
policy would help the IFI staff perform their duties in a manner that
conforms to the IFIs' responsibilities to promote and protect human rights. It
would also help other stakeholders in these operations understand what they
can expect from the IFIs in this regard and hold the IFIs accountable for
their human rights performance. Finally, this policy would help ensure
that the IFIs' own operating policies and procedures follow the same
principles
of good governance-transparency,
accessibility,
and
accountability-that they advocate for their Member States.

